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INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESERVATIONS
TO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
MARCELLUS R. MEEK
NE of the means by which States as subjects of international
law acquire rights from, and undertake obligations toward,
other subjects of international law is the formal conclusion
of treaties.' A treaty is a source of international law, and, as such,
governs to a substantial degree the relations existing between the inde-
pendent States of the world.
Although treaties have from time to time2 been referred to as con-
tracts or compacts between States, it was early agreed that interna-
tional transactions, whatever their descriptive designation, were of a
higher order and distinguishable in principle from private contracts.,
But, it has been said, in solving the problems to which the practice of
attaching reservations to the signature or ratification of treaties gives
rise, the analogy between international treaties and the contracts of
private law has been found useful.4
In an effort to make this statement more readily comprehensible, it
might be well at this point to digress for a moment to consider by way
of preliminary examination what is meant by the term "reservation."
The authorities are not in accord, but, in recent times, the most wide-
1 Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law 62 (3d ed., 1952). Distinctions
have been made by text writers between the terms "treaty" and "convention," signi-
fying varying degrees of formality or importance. The writer has accorded the terms
synonymity for the purposes of this article, and they will be used interchangeably to
denote any formal contractual engagement between States.
2 Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement 3 (2d ed., 1916); Wilson, Hand-
book of International Law 199 (3d ed., 1939); The Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U.S.
176 (1901).
8 Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis, Universal Classics Library 166 (1901); Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 1(a),
29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 686-698 (1935).
4 McNair, The Law of Treaties 105 (1938).
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ly accepted definition of the term is that propounded by the Harvard
Research in its Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is as
follows:
[A "reservation" is a] formal declaration by which a State, when signing, rati- -
fying or acceding to a treaty, specifies as a condition of its willingness to become
a party to the treaty certain terms which will limit the effect of the treaty in so
far as it may apply in the relations of that State with the other State or States
which may be parties to the treaty. 5
It should be noted, however, that this definition restricts the use of
the term "reservation" to those declarations which "limit the effect" of
the treaty as between the reserving State and the other party or parties
to the treaty,8 and excludes those declarations which have for their
purpose the amendment7 of the treaty, or are merely "understandings"
or "interpretations." Other definitions have not thus limited the term
as a precise word of art, and contemplate as a reservation any formal
written declaration relating to the terms of the agreement which is
communicated to the other interested parties.8 Notwithstanding the
fact that there is little basis upon which to justify the juridical status
of treaty reservations, it is submitted that agreement can be reached
on the proposition that a reservation is any declaration made by a
State, as part of its signature or ratification of, or accession to, a treaty,
irrespective of the nomenclature employed, the effect of which is to
work a change in the rights or obligations devolving upon any of the
interested States. This is not to say that every declaration is a reserva-
tion, but, rather, only those declarations which involve a diminution
of the rights and obligations accruing under the treaty.
The significance of a clearly delineated construction of the terms
may be readily observed when it is seen that, as a universal principle,
reservations must be submitted to the other States for expression by
5 Art. 13, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 843 (1935).
6 Comment, ibid., at 857.
7 Amendments before ratification have been distinguished from reservations by rea-
son of their involving textual changes, and thus altering the treaty for all the parties
in their relations inter se. A reservation, on the other hand, limits the effect of the treaty
only as it applies between the State making the reservation and the other contracting
parties, and does not involve a textual alteration. For an illuminating discussion regard-
ing these distinctions, see Washburn, Treaty Amendments and Reservations, 5 Cornell
L.Q. 247 (1919); and Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 865 (1935).
8 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 76 (1919); see letter of Mr. Charles Evans Hughes
to Senator Hale, July 24, 1919, concerning proposed reservations to the Covenant of
the League of Nations: Cong. Rec., vol. 58, pt. 4, p. 3302; and Borchard, The Multi-
lateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 A.J.I.L. 116 (1929).
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them of any objections which they might have.9 Such is not the case
with declarations which are merely understandings or interpretations.10
These do not require acceptance by the other interested States, and
are merely expressions, as a domestic matter, of the meaning to be
attached to a particular provision of a given treaty.1
Taken in this light, the analogy between treaties and private con-
tracts is more easily appreciated, especially in its application to the
subject of reservations. It has frequently been said that a reservation
constitutes a counteroffer, requiring assent by the other States,12 but
there is no unanimity in the views of the international jurists and
governments with respect to the legal effect of a State objecting to a
reservation. It is, of course, only where such an objection has been
registered that the full implication of the practice of making reserva-
tions reflects itself. It is for this reason that we are not here concerned
with reservations to bilateral, or bipartite, agreements, since the occa-
sion of an objection to such reservations presents few mechanical diffi-
culties of a serious nature.
Any alterations in the terms or effect of a two-party treaty must
take form either at the moment of signature or of ratification, at which
time a certificate or protocol or proces-verbal of signature, or ratifica-
tion as the case may be, is signed in duplicate by the representatives of
the governments."3 Hence, in either case, the other contracting State
is fully apprised of the modification, and may, at the time of the formal
signature or exchange of ratifications, either assent or object as it sees
fit."'4 In a memorandum dated April 18, 1921, the Solicitor for the De-
partment of State wrote:
9 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 160 (1919); 5 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law 130 (1943); 2 Hyde, International Law 45 (1922); Malkin, Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142 (1926).
10 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 144 (1943).
11 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 857 (1935); see letter of Secretary Hull, July 22, 1936, concerning the
1929 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, quoted in 5 Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law 148 (1943).
12 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 113 (1943); 2 Hyde, International Law
45 (1922); Brierly, The Law of Nations 233 (4th ed., 1949); Schwarzenberger, Manual
of International Law 65 (3d ed., 1952).
13 1 Miller, Treaties, etc. 18 (1931).
14 Where the reservation is first made upon ratification, it has been the custom of the
United States Senate to require an exchange of notes to ascertain whether the proposed
reservations will be acceptable to the other signatory. Owen, Reservations to Multi-
lateral Treaties, 38 Yale L.J. 1086, 1090 (1929); see also Washburn, Treaty Amendments
and Reservations, 5 Cornell L.Q. 247 (1919).
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Where only two nations are negotiating, such matters have at times been
rather easily adjusted between them. It has occasionally been possible for this
Government when concluding a bilateral treaty to get the other government's
consent to the Senate's alteration of the treaty.15
Our discussion, therefore, will be confined to reservations to multi-
lateral agreements, although similarities may be found in the conduct
of negotiations in conformity with established international treaty-
practice, since multilateral conventions, no less than bilateral treaties,
may be spoken of as a form of contract.'"
Generally speaking, reservations to multilateral treaties, as well as
to bilateral treaties, may be introduced at any point in the process of
their conclusion. Because differing legal consequences flow from the
manner in which a reservation is formulated, the time of its introduc-
tion becomes important. 17 Judge Arnold McNair, in his notable and
often cited work, The Law of Treaties, states by way of summary:
A State, which, while wishing to become a party to a treaty, considers that it
can only do so if it can exclude the application to itself of one or more of its par-
ticular provisions, can achieve this object in one of the following ways:
(1) By inducing the other party or parties to insert an express term to this
effect; for instance, Article 287 of the Treaty of Versailles or Article 98 of the
Treaty of Lausanne; this is not really a reservation at all, but it is the best way
of doing what at a later stage can only be done by means of a reservation;
(2) By a reservation attached to the signature of a Treaty by its representa-
tives and duly recorded in a proces-verbal or protocol of signature;
(3) By a reservation attached to the ratification and duly recorded;
(4) In the case of a treaty left open for accession by other States, by a reser-
vation attached to its accession and duly recorded. 18
15 Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State (Nielsen), Apr. 18,
1921, MS. Department of State, file 711.62119/117. Quoted from 5 Hackworth, Digest
of International Law 113 (1943), where he continues, "Where severalnations negotiate,
the difficulties are obvious, since the final act of ratification consists of the deposit of
the ratification with one of the negotiating governments as the depositary after the
general negotiations among all the contracting parties have ceased."
16 See Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142
(1926), where the consideration for the acceptance of the contract by any one party
is its acceptance by the other.
17 "A reservation may take the form of a statement endorsed upon the original treaty
itself .... Or a reservation may be included in the instrument of ratification or accession
of a State.... Or, finally, a reservation may be recorded in a separate formal instrument
collateral to the treaty, such as a protocol or a proces-verbal of signature, a Proces-verbal
of the exchange or deposit of ratifications, a protocol of accession, etc. Conditions or
interpretations recorded in some way other than those above described do not consti-
tute "formal declarations" and hence will not acquire the technical status of reserva-
tions unless expressly maintained elsewhere in some one of the formal records discussed
above." Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, Comment, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 847-849 (1935). See also Miller, Reservations to Trea-
ties 78-79 (1919).
18 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 105-106 (1938). For substantially the same wording,
see 2 Oppenheim, International Law 821-822 (Lauterpact ed., 6th ed., 1947).
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Since only the last three methods described above are said to be true
reservations, we will direct our attention exclusively to an analysis of
their respective properties without further concerning ourselves with
the first example given. We find, then, that reservations may be formu-
lated at the signature or ratification of, or accession to, a treaty; and
that at the time of their formulation, they must be communicated to
the other States for an expression of assent or objection. The means by
which the fact of consent may be established will be found to vary
according to the chronological moment at which the reservation is
given expression. 19
RESERVATIONS MADE AT SIGNATURE
With respect to the formulation of reservations at the time of signa-
ture, it can be said generally that these are conveniently recorded by
means of a protocol, signed with the treaty, in which full recitation is
made of any and all reservations advanced by signatory governments. 20
Or, in the absence of a protocol, a written declaration may be signed
and formally filed by the plenipotentiary of the government making
the reservations, in which it may be stated that the treaty is signed
subject to the reservation contained in the declaration. The plenipoten-
tiary may sign the treaty subject to the reservation or reservations
made in the protocol or declaration, and a certified copy of the pro-
tocol or declaration may accompany the copy of the treaty which is
customarily sent to each signatory government.21
Where, in point of time, a reservation is introduced prior to, or
simultaneously with, the signature of the other States, few problems
of consent arise, since States which sign subsequently, without pro-
test, may be deemed to have impliedly consented to the reservation.
A more complex problem is presented, however, where the signature
of a State, subject to a reservation, does not take place until after other
States have already signed, as where the treaty is left open for signa-
ture for a specified length of time. The fact of consent may still be
implied in such a case, nevertheless, where the reserving State signs the
10 Owen, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 38 Yale L.J. 1095-1096 (1929).
20Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 159 (1926).
21 Telegram of Secretary of State (Colby) to Ambassador to France (Wallace), no.
441, Apr. 21, 1920, MS. Department of State, file 579.6D1/52. Quoted in 5 Hackworth,
Digest of International Law 107 (1943).
22 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 885-886 (1935).
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treaty subject to a reservation which it had previously introduced
and has had recorded in the proceedings of the conference at which
the prior signatories were present.23 This has often been the practice,
and it has, on occasion, been the subject of specific provision in the
treaty.24 In either case, such a reservation previously recorded in the
proceedings of the conference is not to be treated as new matter, the
consent of the prior signatories having been implied,25 so long as no
objection was raised during the conference, or at signature. Where,
however, the reserving State desires to append to its signature a reser-
vation which has not been previously agreed to, consent of the prior
signatories should be given expressly.2
Again, where a treaty is left open for signature until a certain date,
there is the possibility that a reservation may be appended to the sig-
nature of a State that did not participate in the conferences resulting
in the convention. Concerning the legal consequences that might result
in such a case, there are divergent views. Such a State may be restricted
in its signature to that which was agreed upon by the negotiating
parties, as was the practice of the League of Nations,2 7 or it might be
held that such a State should not be precluded from recording such asignature, since the reservation might well have been accepted, if given
expression in time.28 But, it has been declared, in the latter cases before
effect can be given to the reservation, it is essential that the consent of
the other signatories should be obtained. 29
Following an analogy to implied consent, it will be seen that in
every case where a reservation is made at the time of signature, the
ratification of the treaty without objection by any other signatory,
whether it is signed prior to the reservation or not, automatically works
an acceptance of the reservations made at the time of signature.80
23 Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 156-159
(1926).
24 Article 67, International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, 4 Treaties,
etc. 5489 (Trenwith, 1938).
25 See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 885-886 (1935).
28 But see Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 157
(1926).
27 League of Nations Documents (1927) c. 357, M. 130, V.
28 Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 160-161
(1926).
29 Ibid., at 160.
30 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 94 (1919); and see Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 889 (1935).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Where the reservation is introduced for the first time upon ratification,
more difficult problems arise, since the ratification of a treaty by a
State is the act by which the provisions of the treaty are formally con-
firmed and approved, 3' and there is doubt as to what constitutes con-
sent to a reservation once that final act is performed. Thus, where a
reservation is contained in a ratification made after other States have
ratified without reservation, the fact of consent is not as conveniently
established. On the other hand, acceptance of a reservation may be
implied from the failure to object on the part of signatories whose
ratifications are deposited subsequent to the receipt by them of notice
of the ratification with reservations.3 2
RESERVATIONS MADE UPON RATIFICATION
When we referred above to ratification as the act by which a
treaty is finally approved, we might have more precisely spoken of
the exchange, or deposit, of the ratifications as that act which seeks to
bring the treaty into force.3 3 With specific reference to multilateral
agreements, Hackworth writes:
In the case of multilateral treaties, ratifications are usually not exchanged;
rather, they are deposited with a government or an organization such as the
League of Nations or the Pan American Union.
The functions of a depositary of a treaty and its ratifications are: (1) to take
custody of the original document; (2) to furnish certified copies thereof to all
the parties; (3) to receive the instruments of ratifications of the parties, includ-
ing reservations; (4) to advise all the other parties regarding the deposit of each
ratification together with any reservations made; (5) to receive the replies of
the other parties either accepting or rejecting the reservations; and (6) to in-
form all the other parties to the treaty regarding each such reply.
3 4
Where all the ratifications are deposited with a government or an
organization simultaneously there is almost invariably a proces-verbal
of deposit drawn up, recording the receipt of each ratification, and it
is generally the practice to record any reservations in that document.35
However, the procedure with respect to deposit will vary according
to the terms of the treaty; it may be provided that the instruments of
ratification are to be deposited at different times, and the treaty may
31 Ibid., art. 6 (a), 739; and see Owen, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 38 Yale
L.J. 1113 (1929).
32 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 130 (1943).
33 2 Hyde, International Law 47 (1922).
34 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 72 (1943).
35 Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 122-123 (1946); and see Malkin, Reservations
to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 160 (1926).
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go into- force only when all or a certain number of ratifications have
been deposited, or when certain States that are named in the-ratifica-
tion clause of the treaty deposit their ratifications; when the terms of
the treaty have been complied with, a proces-verbal is drawn up and
the treaty comes into force.3
6
The significance of the proces-verbal gains stature when it is seen
that by participation therein, each State consents to all reservations
previously made, whether at signature or ratification, because the
instruments of ratification are found to be "in good and due form."
In practice, the depositary government or organization will not accept
as final the deposit of a ratification with reservations, until the views
of the other States37 with respect to its acceptance or rejection has
been established. Thus, the treaty will not come into force, nor will
the proces-verbal be drawn, until the consent of such States as the
treaty may designate shall have been established. It may well be that
ratification by all the parties is required, in which case the proces-
verbal is not drawn up until the ratification of the last party is de-
posited. 38 As in the case of reservations made at signature, consent of
the other States may be implied.
Where reservations are made upon ratification, therefore, we are
once again directed to a consideration of the point of time relation-
ship created between the introduction of the reservation and other
ratifications. Since subsequent ratification of the treaty by another
State, made with notice of a reservation, and without protest, may be
deemed an implied acceptance of the reservation, we will be primarily
concerned with the legal effect of reservations with respect to States
which have already ratified unconditionally, and with respect to States
which have not yet ratified, but which are signatories. On both ques-
tions there is little agreement to be found in the views of the interna-
tional jurists and governments.
Concerning the legal effect of the reservation with respect to States
which have already ratified the treaty, some authorities have stated
that the reservation should be expressly consented to,39 while others
36 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 93 (1919); Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 122
(1946); Camara, The Ratification of International Treaties 147 (1949).
37 Whether this means "Signatories" or "States which have already ratified" will be
discussed infra, at 48.
38 Camara, The Ratification of International Treaties 148 (1949).
39 Hackworth states that the better rule would seem to be that, in the absence of
some positive act, mere failure to object does not constitute acceptance of the reser-
vation. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 130 (1943); this seems also to have
been the view held by Professor Hyde. 2 Hyde, International Law 45 (1922).
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argue that, unless an objection is expressed within a reasonable time,
the States which previously ratified will be deemed to have impliedly
accepted the reservation. It is not clear under the Pan American
practice whether any action short of an affirmative protest will con-
stitute an effective objection,4 or whether silence alone will constitute
an acceptance of the reservation. The Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law supports the view that a State is bound by a reservation
made subsequent to its own ratification, unless it expressly objects to
the reservation. 2 The doctrine of consent implied from silence in the
case of reservations made at signature seems to have established similar
rules applicable to reservations made upon ratification. The weight of
authority seems to uphold the view that a reservation, whether made
upon signature or ratification, is effective unless an express objection
is registered.43 This would appear to be the better rule, but, of course,
it is presumed that the other ratifying States, prior or subsequent to
the reservation, have notice of the deposit of the reservation, and,
therefore, their silence amounts to an acquiescence in its effect.
The second question causing difficulty is whether the consent of
States which are merely signatories to a treaty is required to give
effect to a reservation made upon ratification. Or, stated negatively,
whether a State which is a signatory, but which has not ratified, may
object to the reservation proposed. The significance of this question
will be more fully appreciated as an implication of the so-called
"unanimity rule," under which it is argued that the consent of all the
parties to a treaty is required to give effect to a reservation, as distinct
from a rule that allows a reserving State to participate in the treaty,
although the treaty will not be in force between the reserving State
and any State that objects to the reservation.44 The Harvard Research
in International Law proposed, in its Draft Convention on the Law
of Treaties, that the consent of all other States which are likely to be
40 McNair, The Law of Treaties 106 (1938); Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral
Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 148 (1926).
41 Article VI of the Convention on Treaties of the Havana Conference of 1928 is
in part as follows: ". . . In case the ratifying State makes reservations to the treaty,
it shall become effective when the other contracting party informed of the reservations
either expressly accepts them, or having failed to reject them formally should perform
actions implying its acceptance."
42 29 AJ.I.L. Supp. 901 (1935).
43 Authorities cited supra notes 40 and 42.
44 The requirement of unanimous consent to reservations will be more fully dis-
cussed infra, at 59.
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affected by a reservation45 must give their consent to the reservation. 6
This includes signatories, and, under the rule requiring unanimous
consent, it is conceivable that a signatory State, though it may never
ratify the treaty itself, might exclude from participation a State that
wishes to ratify the treaty subject to reservations that are acceptable
to all the other States that have already ratified or intend to do so. In
spite of this significant possibility, other authorities have adverted to
the same views. 47 Conversely, however, it is the expressed policy of
the Secretary-General ,of the United Nations, as depositary of con-
ventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, to con-
sider as having legal force only those objections received from States
which have ratified or acceded to the convention, although the text
of the reservation is circulated to all interested States.48 This was also
the policy of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and, like the
practice under the United Nations, it is justified in the interests of
efficiency to keep at a minimum the number of States required to
give unanimous consent to a reservation.49 While it is true that the
practice requiring the consent of all signatories does present certain
practical advantages, such as providing a means of immediate objec-
tion by a State, which, for constitutional reasons, is unable to deposit
its ratification until after the convention has entered into force, it
would seem desirable to find a middle ground. In the interests of
greater participation in multilateral agreements and the progressive
development of international law, agreement might be reached upon
a rule providing for the lapse of a reasonable time after which a signa-
tory State which has not ratified the treaty may no longer register its
objection to the reservation. A similar solution is considered by Man-
ley 0. Hudson in commenting upon the provision in the Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which limited ob-
45 "Those other States are the States which have already become parties to the treaty
or which, as signatories, are likely to become parties." Comment, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 890
(1935).
46 Ibid., at 890.
47 1 Hudson, International Legislation 1 (1931); and see Malkin, Reservations to
Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 148-149 (1926), where, for instance,
when the British ratification of the International Sanitary Convention of 1903 was de-
posited with certain reservations, the French Government, as Headquarter Govern-
ment, insisted on these reservations being communicated to the signatory Powers and
agreed to by them before the ratification could be accepted, despite the fact that the
reservations contained therein had been announced during the conferences.
48 U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Secretary-General on Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950), at 11.
49 Ibid., at 18-19.
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jections to reservations by a signatory State, that had not ratified, to
three years after the convention entered into force, where he said:
This provision represents an innovation in setting two time limits: (1) a time
limit of three years from the date of the instrument within which signatories
which have not proceeded to ratification are nevertheless to be consulted as to
proposed reservations; and (2) a time limit of six months within which a nega-
tive reply to any consultation may be made. It recognizes the possible interest
of signatories which have not proceeded to ratification in the reservations offered
by other signatories, and thus clarifies a point on which there has been doubt.
It also establishes that when reservations other than those agreed to at the time
of signature are proposed, the alternatives are absence of objection from any
State consulted, on the one hand, and abstention from proceeding to deposit of a
ratification or accession on the other hand. 0
While it has often been advocated that specific provisions be contained
in a given treaty with respect to these and other matters, but the lapse
of a stated period of time would not necessarily be more appropriately
a subject for specific provision in a particular convention. It might
easily be formulated as a rule of customary international law suitable
for codification and binding on all States. Similarly, the lapse of a
reasonable time would certainly afford a signatory State sufficient
opportunity to accept the responsibilities of the convention before
objecting to the proposed reservations of any other ratifying States.
And what constitutes a reasonable time, although never a matter of
simple determination, would not present an insurmountable task, if
examined in the light of actual practice.
This problem has received current importance in connection with
the recent Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. As a result of the consideration of the matter by the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the
following specific question was one of those asked of the International
Court of Justice in the request of the General Assembly for an advis-
ory opinion:
II. What would be the legal effect .. if an objection to a reservation is made:
(a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified?
(b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?5 x
In its opinion, rendered on May 28, 195 1,2 the Court pointed out that
the questions placed before it were expressly limited to the Genocide
5OHudson, Reservations to Multipartite International Instruments 32 A.J.I.L. 335
(1938).
51 U.N. General Assembly, Fifth Sess., Doc. A/1517,'Nov. 16, 1950.
52 I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 15. The decision was reached by seven votes to five.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Convention, in spite of the fact that they were abstract in character.
With specific reference to question III quoted above, the Court stated:
(a) that an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not
ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Ques-
tion I [i.e., to exclude the reserving State, if the reservation is not compatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention] only upon ratification. Until
that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual atti-
tude of the Signatory State.5
a
Thus, the Court, while recognizing that a signatory should not be
allowed to exclude from participation another State until it has itself
ratified the Convention, conferred upon the signatories a provisional
status pending ratification, during which time they might formulate
objections as a precautionary measure.
The resolution of the General Assembly, by which the advisory
opinion of the Court was requested, also contained an invitation to the
International Law Commission to study the question of reservations
to multilateral conventions in a more general way and a report was
made to the General Assembly by the Commission on August 23,
1951, in which it disagreed with the view held by the majority of the
International Court of Justice. On the precise point under discussion,
it stated:
(b) A State which tenders a ratification or acceptance with a reservation may
become a party to the convention only in the absence of objection by another
State which, at the time the tender is made, has signed, or ratified or otherwise
accepted the convention; when the convention is open to signature during a
limited fixed period, also in the absence of objection by any State which signs,
ratifies, or otherwise accepts the convention after the tender is made but before
the expiration of this period; provided, however, that an objection by a State
which has merely signed the convention should seek to have the effect of ex-
cluding the reserving State from becoming a party, if within a period of twelve
months from the time of the making of its objection, the objecting State has not
ratified or otherwise accepted the convention.
54
It is readily observed that the proposals made by the International Law
Commission are not without merit. It is seen that a State which is a
signatory to a convention, and which, because it has not completed the
time-consuming constitutional processes prerequisite to ratification,
has not itself ratified the convention, may nevertheless express its ob-
jection to a proposed reservation of another State. At the same time, a
safeguard is provided against allowing a State which does not become
53 Ibid., at 30.
54 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (a/1858), pp. 7-8 (1951).
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a party to a convention to exclude the participation of other States.
The twelve-month period is reasonable and contemplates little diffi-
culty for application in practice.5
The difficulty may very often arise as a result of the delay encoun-
tered by a State in complying with its own constitutional processes
necessary for ratification. In such a case, the State has in good faith
entered into the negotiation of the treaty, and having signed it, finds
that after its signature, but, before it has had time to ratify the instru-
ment, another State has introduced a reservation which so alters the
treaty as to deprive it of the value contemplated. What reservations or
modifications are formulated during the interval between signature
and ratification can be of great concern to any signatory State, and
confers upon it a real interest sufficient to support a right of objection,
provided there are limits where the "unanimity rule" is practiced.
In passing, it might be of interest to note that were it not possible
for a State to formulate reservations for the first time upon ratification,
the question would not arise of whether signatory States might object
to them, as distinguished from States which have already ratified the
treaty. Further, where ratification of a treaty is required,5" if the
formulation of reservations were restricted to any point up to the time
of signature, there would be far less mechanical difficulties, since in
nowise could the reservation postdate the act of another State by
which it has put the final symbol of its approval upon the treaty. But,
however advantageous or desirable it may be, such a restriction upon
the time of making reservations does not exist, and is given expression
in no principle of international law or treaty-making practice. On the
contrary, it is almost universally agreed that reservations may be
formulated at any time-signature, ratification, or accession.5 7
It is nonetheless true, however, that many writers have not favored
55 It should be pointed out that the report of the International Law Commission was
not adopted by the General Assembly, but it is felt that the formulation of this principle
will go far in reaching a solution to the problems at hand.
50 Ratification is generally recognized as necessary in present day treaties, especially
in the case of multilateral treaties. See Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 158-159
(1946); and Camara, The Ratification of International Treaties 46 (1949), who states,
"in the present stage of development of International Law, ratification, as a general
rule, is an essential formality for the validity of treaties .... ibid.; see also Harvard Re-
search in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L.
(Supp.) 763-769 (1935).
57 The question of reservations made at the time of a State's accession to a treaty
will be discussed infra, at 55.
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the practice of making reservations upon ratification, even up to the
present day.58 Oppenheim seems to have held this view when he said:
It follows from the nature of ratification, as a necessary confirmation of a
treaty already concluded, that ratification must be either given or refused, no
conditional or partial ratification being possible. 59
In justification of this position, it was said that a ratification which
contains a modification of the terms of the treaty is a refusal to ratify,
coupled with a fresh offer, which may or may not be accepted.60
However sagacious or relevant these arguments may appear, it would
seem that what has been made is no more than a statement which is
generally held to be applicable to all reservations, that is, that the
change in the terms of the treaty must be agreed to by the other
parties.
It is true, of course, that the introduction of reservations prior to,
or at the time of signature provides a greater degree of notice to the
other parties, but any argument insisting upon such notice of proposed
reservations prior to ratification fails to take into account the absolute
impossibility of such a procedure for countries such as the United
States, in which Senate approval is required as a constitutional limita-
tion upon the treaty-making power.' It has been said that the negotia-
tion of international treaties is a generally recognized function of the
Executive, 2 but that is not strictly true, since, for example, the Con-
stitution of the United States specifically provides that the President
shall have the power to make treaties only "by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate," and "provided two-thirds of the Senators pres-
ent concur." ' While the President need not seek the advice and con-
sent of the Senate prior to the negotiation or signature of the treaty, 4
it is a matter of absolute necessity that the treaty be submitted to the
Senate for approval before it is ratified. "5 This is done by means of a
58 Camara, The Ratification of International Treaties 149-150 (1946); also see Malkin,
Reservations to Multilateral Convention, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 159-160 (1926); and Oppen-
heim, International Law (6th ed., Lauterpact ed.) 820 (1947).
59 International Law (6th ed., Lauterpact ed.) 820 (1947).
60 Ibid.
61 For a complete analysis of the function of the United States Senate, see Butler, The
Treaty-making Power of the United States (1902), and Crandall, Treaties, Their Mak-
ing and Enforcement (2d ed., 1916).
62 Camara, The Ratification of International Treaties 150 (1949).
63 Art. II, Sec. 2.
64 5 Moore, International Law Digest 197 (1906); Miller, Reservations to Treaties 1
(1919).
65 5 Moore, International Law Digest 191 (1906); Miller, Reservations to Treaties 1
(1919); 2 Hyde, International Law 41 (1922).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Senate resolution which authorizes the President to make the ratifica-
tion, if he is so disposed. 6 And it was early established that the Senate
had the right under the Constitution to reject the treaty entirely, as it
did the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, or to make its approval subject to
reservations, as in the case of the Algeciras Convention of 190667 and
the Hague Convention of 1907 for the settlement of International
Disputes. 8 It is not to be presumed, however, that the formulation of
reservations upon ratification is limited to States having a separation of
treaty-making powers. Many examples, too numerous to mention,
testify clearly that such is not the case.
Where such domestic limitations upon the treaty-making power of
a State do exist, however, we might wonder what effect their exist-
ence has upon the relations of that State with other nations. It has been
said that "there is assumed to be a rule of customary international law
that constitutional requirements must be satisfied."'6 9 Thus, there is
recognition, at least, of the necessity for compliance with constitu-
tional provisions, and it would seem to be a necessary corollary that
reservations formulated upon ratification be given like recognition. It
is a natural consequence of a separation of the treaty-making power
that reservations will be given expression for the first time in the form
of a reservation made at the time of ratification. When Senate approval
is sought, other points of view are called into play, which found no
direct expression in the negotiation and signature of the treaty.7"
In many cases, even though the negotiations are closed and the
treaty is signed, the other parties to the treaty may find no objection
to the proposed reservation, and, as we have seen, consent may be im-
plied from acquiescence or subsequent ratification by the other signa-
tories after notice. The real difficulty arises when an objection to the
proposed reservation is expressed by one or more of the other parties
to the treaty.
Before dealing with the effect of objections to a proposed reserva-
tion, it would be well to discuss the formulation of reservations upon
accession.
66 The President need not make the ratification, however, and may withdraw the
treaty from the Senate at his discretion, or withhold from the Senate a treaty already
signed. 2 Hyde, International Law 44 (1922).
67 2 Malloy's Treaties 2183.
68 Ibid., at 2247.
69 Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 141 (1946).
70 Owen, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 38 Yale L.J. 1090 (1929).
INTERNATIONAL LAW
RESERVATIONS MADE UPON ACCESSION
The technique by which non-signatory States become parties to a
treaty has been variously described as accession, ahesion or adher-
ence; and the practice has been developed largely as a result of the
conclusion in increased numbers of multilateral treaties. These are
often referred to as "law-making" or "legislative" in character, and,
as the Harvard Research found, they
frequently envisage a process by which States which did not participate in the
negotiation thereof, or which did not affix their signatures thereto, and which
cannot therefore, normally at least, proceed to ratification, can become parties
to them on a status exactly the same as that enjoyed by those States which nego-
tiated, signed, and ratified them in the normal way. 71
Whether a State is non-signatory because it did not participate in the
negotiation of the treaty, or because it chose not to sign it within the
period during which it was open for signature, is not significant. 72 The
three terms in common practice are employed interchangeably, but
attempts have been made to distinguish them by confining the term
"accession" to those situations where a non-signatory State accepts
the whole treaty, with all the rights and obligations arising under it,73
and restricting the term adhesion to those situations where there is
only a partial acceptance of the treaty. These distinctions, however,
are unsupported by the practice of States, and there have been in-
stances where both terms were used to refer to the same process in a
single instrument.74 The United States Department of State, for in-
stance, favors the term "adherence, ' 7 while in British practice "acces-
sion" is more often employed, and in French, the term "adhesion"
means either adhesion, accession or adherence. 76
In recent times, the practice has evolved whereby a State accedes to
a treaty, subject to ratification, and, because deposit of the instrument
71 Comment, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 812 (1935).
72 1 Hudson, International Legislation xlvii, n. 1 (1931). "Instances are rare in which
a signatory State desires to adhere to an instrument instead of ratifying it."
73 See 1 Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed., Lauterpact ed.) 743 (1947).
74 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 814 citing Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice.
75 On this point, consult 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 75 (1943), where
he quotes excerpt from memorandum of Second Assistant Secretary of State (Adee):
"... Mr. Bacon and I have, in a philological spirit, discussed the word 'adhesion' and
on the authority of the Century Dictionary we lean to adherence. Adhesion smacks
of the gum-bottle." Ibid.
76 See 1 Hudson, International Legislation xlvii, n. 2 (1931).
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of accession is generally held sufficient, the practice has received a
good deal of attention. A thorough discussion of that question, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this article, and it must suffice to say that
the practice is not favored, though it is apparently recognized as per-
missible in the absence of a provision in the treaty to the contrary. 77
Another problem is frequently raised in connection with the proc-
ess of accession, and that is whether a non-signatory State may accede
to a treaty before it has come into force. The consensus of juridical
opinion seems to indicate a negative reply. Hudson, for example,
states, "It would seem, also, that until an instrument has come into
force, it cannot be adhered to by non-signatory States .... -78 This
view is expressed by the Harvard Research group in Article 12 (b) of
their Draft Convention, "Unless otherwise provided in the treaty it-
self, a State may accede to a treaty only after the treaty has come into
force.. .. "79
It is generally agreed, therefore, that any instruments of accession
received by a depositary must remain without effect until the treaty
comes into force.80
The most basic concept inherent in the nature of accession is the
notion that the process is predicated upon the consent of the parties
to the treaty. Hudson writes:
Non-signatory States may not adhere to an instrument without an invitation
or permission to do so, given by the signatory States; such an invitation will
usually be contained in a provision in the instrument itself, and such provisions
are common in recent multipartite instruments.81
77 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 820 (1935). Compare Article 19 of the Convention on Treaties adopted
by the Sixth International Conference of American States (1928), ". . . The adherence
shall be deemed final unless made with express reservation of ratification"; and Resolu-
tion of the League of Nations Assembly, Sept. 23, 1927, "The Procedure of accession
to international agreements given subject to ratification is an admissible one which the
League should neither discourage nor encourage;" Official Journal, Spec. Supp. No.
53, at 10. See also I Hudson, International Legislation xlviii (1931).
78 Ibid., at xlviii.
79 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 822 (1935).
8OSee Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 129-131 (1946), for a discussion of this
question, upon which, he states, "doubts have arisen." Often cited for the proposition
that the effective date of a premature accession is the date the treaty enters into force
is the Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928, where a number of accessions were
deposited before the last required ratification brought the treaty into force. The acces-
sions were held ineffective until the treaty came into force between the signatory
States. U.S. Treaty Series, No. 796, at 6.
81 1 Hudson, International Legislation xlvii-xlviii (1931).
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The privilege of accession, furthermore, may be granted to certain
States only, or it may be extended to all non-signatory States wishing
to adhere to the terms of the treaty.8 2 The latter is accomplished by
means of an "open accession clause" and if there is no provision in the
instrument for accession by any other States, it is said to be a "closed
convention."'83
Dependent as it is upon the absolute consent of the signatory States,
we may wonder whether an instrument of accession may contain a
reservation which will limit the effect of the treaty as it relates to the
acceding State. We have seen that the weight of authority would dic-
tate an affirmative answer, but in this case also, as in the case of a
ratification made subject to a reservation, the text of the instrument
of accession with the reservation must be communicated to the other
parties. 84
Similarly, the consent necessary to give effect to the reservation
may properly be implied from failure to object after notification is
adequately given.85 Here again, acquiescence, not mere silence, is re-
quired, and express consent by means of a protocol, or proces-verbal,
is to be desired.88 The generally accepted practice of States with re-
spect to reservations made at the time of accession to a multilateral
treaty is apparently very similar to that regarding reservations made
at the time of ratification. They must be communicated to all parties
for an expression of assent or objection, and consent is the primary
factor to be given consideration.
It becomes obvious, from what has been said, therefore, that in res-
ervations forming a part of an instrument of accession, as in the case of
82 Consult for a good analysis, Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 828-9 (1935).
83 There is, however, an apparently contrary view expressed in Article 19 of the
Havana Convention on Treaties, which is in part as follows: "A State not participating
in the making of a treaty may adhere to the same if none of the other of the contracting
parties be opposed.. ." 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2378 (1931).
84 This includes, in view of the Harvard Research group, both the signatory States,
whether they have ratified or not, and all States which have previously acceded to the
treaty. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 905-11 (1935); but the Secretary General would, of course,
limit the consent required to only those Signatory States which have ratified, and non-
signatory States which have already acceded. U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Sec-
retary-General on Reservations to Multilateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950) at 19-20.
85 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 148-154 (1919).
86 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
29 AJ.I.L. Supp. 911 (1935).
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ratification, or signature, the most difficult problems are presented
when an actual objection is expressed by one or more of the parties to
the treaty.
OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS
It is felt that any inquiry into the legal consequences which ema-
nate from an expressed refusal of one of the parties to accept a reser-
vation, whether proposed at the time of signature, ratification or ac-
cession, must concern itself with an analysis of the opposing views
which prevail regarding the juridical relationship existing between the
parties to the treaty. It is considered, therefore, that the discussion re-
solves itself into a question of whether one State, which was a party
to the negotiation of a treaty, or has bound itself to the terms thereof,
has by such action acquired the right to exclude from participation in
the treaty another State which has proposed a reservation found to be
objectionable. This is summarized by Fenwick, who states, after ex-
plaining that the difficulty arises when, out of a large number of signa-
tories, certain States are unwilling to accept the proposed reservation:
In such cases there is a choice of two distinct procedures, either to exclude the
state proposing the reservation from participation in the treaty, or to permit it
to participate with the large majority who are willing to accept its reservation,
leaving the treaty without effect in relation to the States unwilling to accept the
reservation.87
The first of these procedures was adopted by the League of Na-
tions, and is now the recognized policy of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. 8 The second procedure is followed by the Pan
American Union in discharging its function as depositary in connec-
tion with inter-American treaties. Because of the great diversity of
opinion which exists concerning the effect to be given an objection to
proposed reservations, specific reference to practices that have been
followed in particular treaties can serve no other purpose than to illu-
cidate the dychotomy which the practices themselves reflect. They
cannot be deemed authority for one or the other positions maintained.
The primary purpose of this article is to determine which of the
two procedures deserves juristic preference, in the light of the present
stage of development of international law.
87 Fenwick, Rerservations to Multilateral Treaties, 45 A.J.I.L. 145 (1951).
88 U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Secretary-General on Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950) at 4.
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PRACTICE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Let us consider first the so-called "unanimity rule" as promulgated
and practiced in the League of Nations.
The practice of the League of Nations adhered to the concept of
consent which is embodied in the so-called "unanimity rule." Reserva-
tions must have been consented to by at least all of the other parties
to the treaty to be effective, and this principle was given expression by
the League Assembly by its adoption in 1927 of the report of a Com-
mittee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law, prepared on the "Admissibility of Reservations to General Con-
ventions." 9 This report followed the British objection to reservations
made by Austria to the Convention on Traffic in Opium and Drugs of
February 19, 1925,90 and provided, in part, as follows:
In order that any reservation whatever may be validly made in regard to a
clause of the treaty, it is essential that this reservation should be accepted by all
the contracting parties, as would have been the case if it had been put forward
in the course of the negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the signature to
which it is attached, is null and void.91
This rule was adhered to in connection with the Protocol for the Re-
vision of the Permanent Court of International Justice of September
14, 1929, when Cuba ratified with certain reservations which were ob-
jected to by other States that had ratified the Protocol previously.
Cuba, upon the advent of these objections, withdrew its reservations
and deposited a new ratification without reservations on March 14,
1932.92
The Assembly stated at that time that it considered it to be the rule
that "a reservation can only be made at the moment of ratification if
all the other signatory States agree or if such a reservation has been
provided for in the text of the convention. ' '93
89 League of Nations Official Journal 800 (1927).
90 League of Nations Official Journal 612 (1926); 3 Hudson, International Legisla-
tion 1589 (1931); and see Hudson, Reservations to Multipartite International Agree-
ments, 32 A.J.I.L. 33 (1938).
91 League of Nations Official Journal 881 (1927).
92 See, for complete analysis, Hudson, The Cuban Reservation and the Revision of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 26 A.J.I.L. 590 (1932);
League of Nations Official Journal, Records of the Twelfth Assembly, Plenary 139
(1931).
93Resolution adopted on September 25, 1931, League of Nations Official Journal,
Records of the Twelfth Assembly, Plenary 139 (1931).
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Thus, a ratification or accession 94 containing reservations was not
considered as definitively deposited until the Secretary-General made
it known to the other governments concerned, and an acceptance
thereof could be implied or was expressed. If an objection was re-
ceived, the reserving State would be informed of such fact and would
be requested to decide whether it wished to ratify or accede without
reservation or, as its only alternative, refrain from participation in the
treaty altogether.
This practice was in principle justified by the use of a theory which
presupposes that a multilateral treaty is "an agreement in which each
party finds compensation for the obligations [it has] contracted in the
engagements entered into by the others." ' Or, stated another way,
"the consideration for the acceptance of the contract by any one
party is its acceptance by the others. ' 96 In this way it is argued that a
multilateral agreement is one whole and single offer, which must be
accepted unanimously by all the parties without qualification.
Whether or not treaties of a multipartite nature are susceptible of
such a construction or whether only certain classes of treaties are in
essence properly so defined will be discussed below.97 Such an inter-
pretation, however, formed the basis of the League of Nations prac-
tice and still exists as the underlying principle in support of the con-
tinuing practice of the Secretariat of the United Nations.
PRACTICE OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION
The dissimilarities existing between the practice of the League and
that of the Pan American Union are of a fundamental character.
While under the Pan American view, sometimes referred to as the
"liberal rule," the consent to a reservation by all the parties must be
sought, as under the "unanimity rule," the non-acceptance of the res-
ervation by any State creates entirely different legal consequences re-
94 The United States and Hungary acceded to the Slavery Convention of September
25, 1926, with reservations which were received by the Secretariat of the League of
Nations subject to acceptance by the States which had signed or acceded to the treaty,
and the reservations were communicated to these States for their acceptance or re-
jection. League of Nations Document A.17.1930.VI., p. 2; and see Harvard Research in
International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 910
(1935).
95 League of Nations Document A.10.1930.V., p. 2.
96 Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142 (1926).
97 See page 69 infra.
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garding the status of the treaty as it relates to the reserving and object-
ing States.
The preparation of treaties under the auspices of the Pan American
Union has been governed to a large extent by the Convention on
Treaties adopted at the Sixth International Conference of American
States held at Havana from January 16 to February 20, 1928.98 It con-
tained the following provision:
In International treaties celebrated between different States, a reservation made
by one of them in the act of ratification affects only the application of the clause
in question in the relation of the other contracting States with the State making
the reservation. 99
Subsequently, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union
adopted a resolution formulating rules to govern the procedure to be
followed by it in the exercise of its functions as a depositary for trea-
ties.100 The resolution provided for the receipt by the Pan American
Union of ratifications including reservations, the communication of
the deposit of such instruments of ratification and reservations to the
other States, the receipt of replies either accepting or objecting the
reservations, and the communication of such replies to all the signa-
tory States. The resolution further provided, however, with respect to
the juridical status of treaties ratified with a reservation to which ob-
jection had been made, that the Governing Board understands:
1. The treaty shall be in force, in the form in which it was signed, as between
those countries which ratify it without reservations, in the terms in which it was
originally drafted and signed.
2. It shall be in force as between the Governments which ratify it with reser-
vations and the Signatory States which accept the reservations in the form in
which the treaty may be modified by said reservations.
3. It shall not be in force between a Government which may have ratified with
reservations and another which may have already ratified, and which does not
accept such reservations.1 01
A few years later, at Lima, another resolution adopted by the Govern-
ing Board of the Union supplemented the treaty procedure, and it
provides:
2. In the event of adherence or ratification with reservations, the adhering or
ratifying State shall transmit to the Pan American Union, prior to the deposit
of the respective instrument, the text of the reservation which it proposes to
98 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2378 (1931).
99 Ibid., at 2381.
100 Resolution adopted May 4, 1932.
101 Eighth International Conference of American States, Special Handbook for the
Use of Delegates, Pan American Union 57-58 (1938).
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formulate, so that the Pan American Union may inform the signatory States
thereof and ascertain whether they accept it or not. The State which proposes
to adhere to or ratify the Treaty, may do it or not, taking into account the obser-
vations which may be made with regard to its reservations by the signatory
States.10 2
The effect of the Lima Resolution, it is seen, is merely to give the
reserving State an opportunity to determine, before completing its rat-
ification through deposit, the objections which the other signatory
States might have to its reservation. The reserving State may still,
however, after obtaining any observations or objections, proceed to
ratification. Should there be any objection to its reservation, the treaty
will not be in force and effect as between the reserving State and the
objecting State.10 3
The basic factor underlying the Pan American practice, as it has
developed, is wider participation, even though limited as to some
States. No State, however, is forced to be bound by a treaty in its re-
lation to any party which has made a reservation to which it objects.
It is felt that the advantages of the practice are immediately appar-
ent when viewed in the light of the desirability of permitting a maxi-
mum number of States to become parties to a convention, despite the
fact that some of them have undertaken "to apply only a portion of
the text and exchange that undertaking with only a portion of the
parties." °4
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The procedure followed by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations with respect to treaties of which it is a depositary conforms
rigidly to the principles enunciated by the League of Nations. 10 5 Nu-
merous instances of this are cited by the Secretary-General in a report
concerning reservations to multilateral conventions dated September
20, 1950. For example, in connection with the entry into force of the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, the reserva-
tions made by several States were circulated to all parties and a date
specified within which they were to make their observations or objec-
102 Final Act of the Eighth International Conference of American States 48 (1938).
103 For an illuminating discussion regarding the addition of the requirement of the
Lima resolution, see Sanders, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties Made in the Act of
Ratification or Adherence, 33 A.J.I.L. 488 (1939).
104 U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of Secretary-General on Reservations to Multilateral
Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950).
105 Ibid., at 3-4.
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tions. The Constitution was not considered as having entered into
force until that date had passed. 1°6
Similarly, the ratification of the World Health Organization by the
United States containing reservations was not considered by the Sec-
retary-General to have been effectively deposited until it was unani-
mously accepted by the World Health Assembly.
It should be stated that the procedure followed by both the League
of Nations and the Secretariat of the United Nations is in accord with
the view of the majority of international jurists and publicists. Al-
though this is not to say that by reason of such authority it is felt that
the "unanimity rule" is to be preferred, the position of the Secretariat
can on this basis be justified.
It would seem that the view which is expounded by the Harvard
Research in International Law, and which forms a basic part of that
portion of its Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties relating to
reservations, lends support to the view of the League and United Na-
tions. It is commented on, in part, as follows:
When a State proposes to make a reservation to a multipartite treaty, whether
at signature, ratification, or accession, it seeks in effect to write into the treaty
at that time "certain terms which will limit the effect of the treaty in so far as it
may apply in the relations of that State with the other State or States" which
are or which become parties to the treaty. It proposes, in effect, to insert in the
treaty a provision which will operate to exempt it from certain of the conse-
quences which would otherwise devolve upon it from the treaty, while leaving
the other States which are or which become parties to the treaty fully subject
to those consequences in their relations inter se and possibly even in their re-
lations vis-d-vis the State making the reservation. It seems clear that a State should
be permitted to do this only with the consent of all other States which are par-
ties, or which, as signatories, are likely to become parties to the treaty, and this
because, as has been said, States are willing in general to assume obligations under
a multipartite treaty only "on the understanding that the other participating
Powers are prepared to act in the same way and that general benefit will thus
result." A multipartite treaty is "an agreement in which each party finds a com-
pensation for the obligations contracted in the engagements entered into by the
others."107
It should be noted, however, that the authors of that work merely
adopted the rule formulated by the Committee of Experts for the Pro-
gressive Codification of International Law mentioned above; 08 and
106 Ibid., at 5.
107 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 870 (1935).
108 See page 59 supra.
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relied upon the "single offer" theory of multilateral treaties.10 9 But
other jurists, as well, had subscribed to the rule of unanimity. Sir
Henry Malkin in 1926 had this to say:
If, however, any party is entitled, without the consent of the other signatories,
to pick out of the convention any provisions to which it objects and exclude them
by means of a reservation from the obligations which it accepts, it is obvious,
not only that the object of the convention might be largely defeated, but that
the consideration indicated above is impaired or even destroyed; the other signa-
tories are not in fact getting what they bargained for.110
And Judge Arnold McNair supports the view above when he states
that ". . . it is essential that all other parties to the treaty should assent
to the making of the reservation. If they do not, the signature or rati-
fication or accession which the reservation purports to qualify is a
nullity." ''
It would seem that the rule of unanimity expressed by the authori-
ties cited is little more than an example of wide acceptance being given
English International Law. In contrast, it has been stated that the Rus-
sian view favors unanimous consent,112 but it should be pointed out
that, in answer to an objection by Chile to a reservation made by the
Soviet Union in connection with its adherence to the International
Convention for Facilitating the International Circulation of Films of
an Education Character of 1933, the Government of the Soviet Union
proposed that the convention should not bind Chile in relation to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but would apply as between the
Soviet Union and the States which had accepted the reservation.11
Green Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the Department of State of
the United States, apparently contrary to the British view, admits that
a departure from the rule of unanimity may be possible. He states:
Whether a multilateral treaty may be regarded as in force as between a coun-
try making a reservation and countries accepting such reservation, but not in
109 This theory is discussed more fully infra at page 69, and is to be distinguished
from the view which contemplates a multipartite agreement as an aggregate of bilateral
obligations.
110 Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Convention, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142 (1926).
11 McNair, The Law of Treaties 106 (1938).
112U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Secretary-General on Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950) at 8-9, quoting from Institut Prave Akademii Nauk
SSSR, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo (Moscow, 1947) at 388.
118 155 League of Nations Treaty Series 332 (1933); Department of State, 90 Treaty
Information Bulletin 14 (1937).
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force as regards countries not accepting the reservation, depends upon whether
the treaty as signed is susceptible of application to the smaller group of signa-
tories.114
David Hunter Miller also takes this more liberal view when he de-
clares:
The conclusion reached on the subject is that reservations to a treaty, of what-
ever nature, require the assent of the other signatory Power or Powers, and that
in the absence of such assent, the treaty is not in force as between the declarant
and Powers which have not so assented; for the reservations made by the de-
clarant is a part of the agreement of that Power and acceptance of the whole
agreement by the other Party or Parties thereto is essential.115
It is needless to say that there is now, as there always has been, a
wide divergence in the opinions of the international jurists and gov-
ernments; and it is readily apparent that the coexistence of the two
practices, that of the Pan American Union to which the United States
of America is a party, and of the League of Nations to which it was
not, has provided little aid in the solution of the problems attending
reservations to multilateral conventions. The United States is now a
member of the United Nations, as are many other members of the Pan
American Union, and each of these States, like the other members, are
determined:
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties . . . can be maintained, and to develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples .... 116
It is the purpose of the United Nations to be a center for harmoniz-
ing the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
It was the uncertainty which presently exists with respect to the
propriety of following one or the other of the variations in depositary
procedures which persuaded the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions to place before the General Assembly the question of the effect
to be given an objection to a proposed reservation, as well as the ques-
tion previously discussed concerning the effect to be given an objec-
tion made by a signatory State which had not yet ratified the conven-
tion. He said:
2. While it is universally recognized that the consent of the other Govern-
ments concerned must be sought before they can be bound by the terms of a
114 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 130 (1943).
115 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 160 (1919).
116 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations; Article 1, para. 2.
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reservation, there has not been unanimity either as to the procedure to be fol-
lowed by a depositary in obtaining the necessary consent or as to the legal effect
of a State objecting to a reservation.
... The Secretary-General has felt it his duty to place clearly before the Gen-
eral Assembly, for its approval and advice, the principles which he has considered
necessary to follow in the interests both of efficient performance of depositary
functions and of the maximum usefulness of multilateral conventions in the de-
velopment of international law. 1
7
This request arose out of the recent Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to which a number of
States had made reservations either at the time of signature, ratifica-
tion or accession."" The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and
Byelorussia proposed similar reservations seeking to avoid reference of
disputes to the International Court of Justice without the consent of
all parties, and to extend the provisions of the convention to non-self-
governing territories. A Philippine reservation sought, inter alia, to
insure for its Head of State the same immunity guaranteed by its
Constitution.
Objections to some or all of these reservations were expressed by
Australia, Ecuador and Guatemala, which States had previously rati-
fied the Convention without reservation. 119 While the Convention en-
tered into force as a result of the deposit of twenty-two ratifications,
and a proces-verbal was drawn up on October 14, 1950, with effect
from January 12, 1951, the question still remained as to the procedure
to follow in counting instruments of ratification toward those required
by the Convention to bring it into force.
In response to the Secretary-General's report, the Sixth Committee
recommended that the General Assembly refer to the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion the question of the effect of
reservations specifically to the Genocide Convention, and, by a reso-
lution adopted in its fifth session, this was done. 2° In addition, the
General Assembly referred to the International Law Commission the
larger problem of reservations to multilateral conventions generally,
to be studied "both from the point of view of codification and from
that of the progressive development of international law.' 121
117 U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Secretary-General on Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950) at 3.
118 For the full text of the reservations made, see Ibid., Annex 1 at 22-27.
119 For a discussion of these facts, see Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 45
A.J.I.L. 149 (1951).
120 U.N. General Assembly, 5th Session, Doc. A/1517 (Nov. 16, 1950).
121 Ibid.
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The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which
was rendered on May 28, 1951, was, of course, restricted in its applica-
tion to the Genocide Convention, and was reached by seven votes to
five. 122 The majority opinion, cognizant of the special character of the
Genocide Convention as an instrument of great interest to the entire
international community, advised that a State which has made a reser-
vation, even though it is objected to by other parties, may be regarded
as being a party to the Convention "if the reservation is compatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention." The minority of the
Court, in a joint dissenting opinion, criticized the majority ruling and
stated that there was no legal basis in international law for such a
"new" rule. Further, it felt that, under such a system, there would be
no practical means of determining whether a reservation was compati-
ble with the object and purpose of the Convention. Thus, in the mi-
nority opinion, the "unanimity rule" was advocated as the existing rule
of international law, supported by the weight of authority and United
Nations practice.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly, by a resolution adopted Jan-
uary 12, 1952, recommended that States be guided by the Advisory
Opinion of the Court with respect to the Convention. 23
Of greater concern for our purposes, however, is the report of the
International Law Commission which was rendered on August 23,
1951, and which covered the broader problem of Reservations to Mul-
tilateral Agreements in general. The Commission had before it the ad-
visory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and reviewed the
existing practices of the Pan American Union and the Secretariat of
the United Nations. It concluded that the practice of the Organiza-
tion of American States, while perhaps suitable for their needs by rea-
son of their common historical traditions and close cultural bonds, was
not to be recommended for application to multilateral conventions in
general.124 Similarly, the "criterion of the compatibility of a reserva-
tion with the object and purpose of a multilateral Convention, applied
by the International Court of Justice" was not considered suitable for
application as a general rule, for the reason that the status of the re-
serving State is too uncertain.
Thus, the Commission, in recommending a rule which it felt to "be
122 I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 15.
123 U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., Doc. A/L.37 (Jan. 14, 1952).
124 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/1858), p. 5 (1951).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the least unsatisfactory and suitable for application in the majority of
cases,"'125 adopted the "unanimity rule" practiced by the United Na-
tions Secretariat and advocated by the minority of the International
Court of Justice.
While it recognized that it is desirable that multilateral conventions
should have the widest possible acceptance, the Commission felt that
it was also desirable to maintain uniformity in the obligations of all the
parties to them, and it was considered that "it may often be more im-
portant to maintain the integrity of a Convention than to aim, at any
price, at the widest possible acceptance of it. ' '1 2 6
The report of the Commission was not adopted by the General As-
sembly however, and instead, the Secretary-General was instructed
to accept the deposit of documents containing reservations or objec-
tions "without passing upon the legal effect of such documents," and
to communicate the text of such documents to all States concerned,
"leaving it to each State to draw the legal consequences from such
communications.' 127
It has been said that the rejection of the Report of the International
Court of Justice represented the desire of the majority to obtain
greater flexibility in the obligations of treaties through reservations.128
It is obvious that no solution to the problem has as yet been reached.
Ancillary to an examination of the practices of these depositary au-
thorities in the exercise of their respective functions, it may not be
amiss to consider the juridical nature of the reservation per se. More
specifically, we should seek to appreciate the legal consequences which
flow from the introduction of a change in the terms of a treaty. Gen-
erally speaking, a reservation may either take the form of an excep-
tion of particular provisions or limitation of the application of certain
provisions to the reserving State.' 9 Basic to the nature of a reservation
is the fact that in no case does it seek to affect the relations of the non-
reserving States to each other.180 Thus, the other parties are bound by
125 Ibid., at 6.
126Ibid.
127 U.N. General Assembly, 6th Sess., Doc. A/L.37 (Jan. 14, 1952).
128 Fenwick, When is a Treaty Not a Treaty?, 46 A.J.I.L. 297 (1952).
129 1 Hudson, International Legislation I-li (1931).
18 0 The Harvard Research commented on this point: [A reservation is a formal dec-
laration which will limit the effect of the treaty] "in so far as it may apply in the rela-
tion of that State with the other State or States which may be parties to the Treaty."
Harvard Research on International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29
A.J.I.L. Supp. 865 (1935).
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the reservation only in their relations toward the reserving State. 8'
Notwithstanding the general acceptance given this premise, some writ-
ers argue that because a multilateral treaty is a single contract, any
exclusion from, or modification of, the terms thereof which is not ac-
quiesced in by all of the other parties is null and void, since there is no
meeting of the minds. Sir Henry Malkin, for instance, in his excellent
article, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, maintains this view
when he declares:
Multilateral conventions are after all only a form of contract in which the
consideration for the acceptance of the contract by any one party is its accept-
ance by the others.132
Because this argument is so basic to the nature of reservations and their
attendant problems, it must be considered in its full perspective. It is
felt that it can have no validity outside the sphere of bilateral treaties,
or, at most, treaties of a multilateral character which require the de-
posit of ratifications from all of the signatory states. The argument is
unsound for the reason that it purports to lay down a general rule ap-
plicable to all multilateral conventions, and the nature of multilateral
treaties today, in seeking wide participation, is such that one State does
not normally condition its acceptance of the terms of a treaty upon
the acceptance of those same terms by all the other parties.
It is a well-settled and almost universally recognized rule, basic to
the law of treaties, that no State is bound to ratify a treaty which it
has signed unless it wishes to do so. 133 The Draft Convention adopted
by the Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties provides unequivo-
cally, "The signature of a treaty on behalf of a State does not create
for that State an obligation to ratify the treaty.' 3 4 And the Havana
Convention on treaties speaks of "refusal to ratify" as an act "inherent
in national sovereignty" and as such constitutes "the exercise of a right
which violates no international stipulation or good form.' 3 5
131 Hudson states, however, that their relations may be affected if they so choose,
"a reservation made by one party may be adopted by the other parties for their rela-
tions inter se; if not so adopted, it would have no application to such relations in the
absence of a provision to the contrary." 1 Hudson, International Legislation 1 (1931).
132 Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142 (1926).
133 See 2 Hyde, International Law 41-43 (1922); and Crandall, Treaties, Their Making
and Enforcement 2 (2d ed., 1916). See also 1 Oppenheim, International Law 818 (6th
ed., Lauterpact ed. 1947).
134 Article 8, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 769 (1935).
185 Article 7, 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2381 (1931). This article also pro-
vides that the "formulation of reservations" are in the same category.
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Hence, it has often been the case that States which have participated
in the negotiation and signature of a treaty have found it inadvisable
for one reason or another to ratify. The Treaty of Versailles is an out-
standing example. If, then, the consideration for the acceptance of a
treaty by one State is the acceptance thereof by all States, as Sir
Henry Malkin suggests, the failure of any one State to ratify the
treaty confers upon a State which has previously ratified it the right
to withdraw its ratification, even though it may have entered into
force by the deposit of a required number of other ratifications. Such
a position is unreasonable, and, having no foundation in the practice
of States, is completely untenable.
Furthermore, it is submitted that no error can be found in stating
that since, in these cases where ratification is not required to bring the
treaty into force, the failure of a signatory State to ratify leave un-
affected the relationship of the other parties, the situation is analogous
to the deposit of a ratification with reservations. In both cases, the re-
lations of the other parties inter se are left unaffected, and if one of
the other States wishes to do so, it may register an objection to the
reservations, rendering the treaty without legal force as between itself
and the reserving State. Thus, it cannot be said that the reserving State
has greater rights, as against the objecting State, though it does par-
ticipate in the treaty.
The most significant defects in the arguments advocating the rule
of unanimous consent are the very consequences which the exercise of
the rule may bring about. Clearly, when a State finds that it cannot
accept a proposed reservation, and finds, even in all sincerity, that it
must object to it, the only conveivable consequence is one of destruc-
tion, rather than construction. This may be best illustrated by means
of an example. Suppose, for hypothetical purposes, States A, B, C, D
and E, with others, conclude negotiations and signature of a treaty
which is to come into force after the deposit of ten ratifications, and
State A attaches a reservation to its ratification which limits the effect
of the treaty by excepting the application of certain of its provisions to
that State. Let us suppose some of the other States, including State B,
had previously ratified without reservation.
If all of the States consent to the reservation, the application of the
clauses in question will only affect the relations of State A with the
other States; their relations inter se will be unaffected. If, however,
State B objects to the reservation, the objection will have the deleteri-
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ous effect of excluding State A from participation in the treaty, while
the relations as between all the non-reserving States will be unchanged.
No valuable purpose, therefore, can be served by requiring unanimous
consent to reservations, especially where the ratification of all the par-
ties to the treaty is required, since the treaty would fall.
It cannot be argued by State B, the objecting State, that it has given
State A more than it has received, since the treaty will not be in force
as between State A and State B, a result which is the same as would
occur if State A were excluded from participating in the treaty alto-
gether. It is felt that a State which is forced, in order to balance its
own domestic interests, to attach a reservation to its ratification will
in the majority of cases be perfectly willing to discharge faithfully its
duties and obligations arising out of the other provisions of the treaty
to which it has subscribed.
Some writers, however, have envisaged a situation in which a pro-
posed reservation would work such a substantial change in the rights
and obligations of the reserving State as to be in effect a rejection of
the terms of the treaty. 13 , Miller contemplates this possibility when he
states:
There are limits, difficult to define, beyond which a reservation may not go.
A declaration which is in substance a rejection of the terms of a treaty cannot
be called a reservation.' 3 7
Treaty practice, on the other hand, has indicated that such is not usu-
ally the case and, were such a situation to arise, there should be no
difficulty in rendering ineffectual the one-sided attempt to participate
in the treaty. It is felt that the terms of any such reservation would be
so objectionable to all or the greater part of the other States as to ex-
clude the reserving State, for all partical purposes, from participation
in the agreement.
Application of the practice of the Organization of American States
to treaties concluded under the auspices of the United Nations has
been felt to be unwarranted on the ground that there is a distinction
to be drawn between the types of treaties concluded under each of the
two systems.
It has been said that the treaties made under the United Nations are
of a law-making character, not of mere contract, and, because they
are multilateral in their purpose as well as their essential juridical ef-
136 See 1 Hudson, International Legislation li (1931).
137 Miller, Reservations to Treaties 79 (1919).
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fect, they contemplate no reservations to which objections have been
expressed. 8"
To sustain this position, reference is made to the distinction ad-
vanced by McNair between treaties which are in the nature of con-
tractual bargains and those which are of a legislative or constitutional
character.'89 This distinction is well taken, but it does not follow logi-
cally that because of its legislative character the conclusion of a treaty
should be subject to the rule of unanimous consent to reservations.
For, after all, it is not contended that no reservations are possible in
such a treaty but merely that reservations are not possible if objected
to by any other party. It is not, therefore, the character of the treaty
which controls the uniformity of its acceptance, but the objection. If
a reservation by one State is not objected to by any other State, the
obligations of the parties are not clearly equal, and the legislative
character of the treaty has nothing to do with it.
Something more may be said, however, for restricting reservations
to treaties which are of a constitutional or organizational nature, since
in that case, it is the participation of all the States which serves as an
inducement to each State, and reservations regarding the obligations of
the parties would violate the object and purpose of the treaty. But in
such a Convention it might easily be provided that no reservations will
be permitted. Here again, however, it is not a question of unanimous
consent to reservations, but of the permissibility of reservations.
In the final analysis, the different legal characteristics of the many
types of treaties is not the criterion for deciding whether a State
should be allowed to participate in a limited way, rather than not par-
ticipate at all. The answer certainly is not exclusion by reason of the
objection of one State.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations Secretariat, in a re-
cent report regarding reservations to multilateral conventions, stated
that the practice followed by the Pan American Union was well
adapted to the needs of a regional agency and "to the close relations
existing between States within a defined geographic area."' 140 Likewise,
188 U.N. Doc. A/1372 Report of the Secretary-General on Reservations to Multi-
lateral Conventions (Sept. 20, 1950) at 12-13.
189 McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 Brit. Y.B.
Int. L. 100 (1930).
140 U.N. Doc. A/1372 at 2 (1950). The Secretary-General also distinguished the Pan
American Practice from that of the United Nations by reason of the nature of the
conventions which were concluded, that is, he stated that the conventions of the Pan
American States, "although multilateral in form, are in operation simply a complex of
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to sustain its restricted application, the Report of the International
Law Commission referred to the common historical traditions and
close cultural bonds of the organization of American States. The
points raised are debatable. Can it be said that it is little more than the
geographical and cultural proximity of the States which gave birth to
that concept of international treaty practice, or was it a spirit of co-
operation seeking to create harmonious relations between independent
States on the widest possible basis? The latter explanation is preferred.
The conflicts of interest, both national and international, which exist
in the whole international community at the present time fervently
bespeak the great need for international cooperation and harmony.
This political disunity is the very evil which we are seeking to reduce.
Mr. Yepes of the International Law Commission advocated the adop-
tion by that body of the Pan American practice and stated:
(1) If the so-called Pan American system of making reservations could be
successfully applied to a complex of States closely linked together and in inti-
mate relations such as the Organization of American States, it could a fortiori
be applied to a much vaster organization more loosely linked together such as
the United Nations, whose universal character makes it less exacting in this re-
spect than a purely regional organization such as the Organization of American
States.14 '
Furthermore, it was maintained by Mr. Yepes:
(2) As the Pan American system was, in his opinion, used in practice by the
majority of the Members of the United Nations, it could be regarded as the
existing law in the matter and, for that reason, should have been adopted by
the Commission.1
42
Thus it is seen that the proposal here made is not original, nor is it
totally unrealistic. It is felt that its adoption as a general rule of in-
ternational law will best serve the needs of the present time with re-
spect to the conclusion of internationl agreements. A multilateral
treaty is an instrument of cohesion and friendship; its function is to
conciliate, to transform utter diversity into a system of at least approx-
imated unity.
The rule requiring unanimous consent to reservations by all parties
to a convention does little more than extend the veto into the sphere
bilateral agreements." Multilateral conventions drawn up under the auspices of the
United Nations, on the other hand, were of a world-wide character by which States
in very diverse circumstances agree to be bound.
141 General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/1858) at 5 (1951).
142 Ibid.
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of the treaty-making process. The conclusion that adherence to the
"unanimity rule" would have the effect of preventing, or at least dis-
couraging, reservations is unfounded in fact and is not substantiated
by actual practice. The finished draft of a given convention is gener-
ally an expression of the will of the majority of the negotiators, and if
a State finds certain provisions to be unacceptable, it must either make
a reservation to the convention or refrain from participation in the
treaty altogether. Which, then, is the more desirable alternative-lim-
ited participation or none at all? A rule which permits the widest pos-
sible participation, it is felt, is certainly to be desired, so long as the
basic structure of the treaty is not impaired.
It is humbly submitted that these ends can in nowise be served by
a rule which contravenes the spirit of compromise and makes impos-
sible the very cooperation which is sought to be established. The in-
ternational community of today, in its present stage of development,
is primarily concerned with international peace and understanding;
this is no longer a world dominated by the laws of "war, peace and
neutrality"; and the office of governments and statesmen today is to
construct, not destroy, that understanding, the lack of which for so
long has plagued mankind.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume V AUTUMN-WINTER 1955 Number 1
BOARD OF EDITORS
ROBERT L. HANKIN, Editor-in-Chief
JOHN F. DONLAN JAMES E. KANE
PHILLIP C. GOLDSTICK WILLIAM M. WARD
JOSEPH N. WILTGEN
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
RAYMOND K. BERG EDWIN L. RYAN, JR.
ROBERT E. PRICE DONAL D. SULLIVAN
STAFF
RALPH M. BERNSTEIN
OSCAR 0. D'ANGELO
SIDNEY N. Fox
ANDREW A. GALICH
SAMUEL KAHN
JUSTINE KNIPPER
HENRY W. McGEE, JR.
KITTY O'CONNOR
H. TED RUBIN
DONALD A. STRAUB
BYRON G. TOBEN
JOHN F. WHITE
BUSINESS STAFF
JEROME Y. ROSENHOLTZ, Manager
MILES N. BEERMANN, Assistant
FACULTY DIRECTOR
FRANCIS J. SEITER
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
